Between Public Peacekeepers and Private Forces:
Can there be a Third Way?

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The article analyses the non-profit/non-state approach for UN peacekeeping as manifest in the proposal made by the Global Peace and Security Partnership (GPSP). The article contends that while there is an obvious need for such an initiative, measured either by worldwide demand or by problems related to private, profit-seeking firms, this third way between public peacekeepers and private forces would face considerable challenges. These challenges would come in dealing with entrenched interests both within and outside of the UN, contending with the varying and limited impact of the profit motive and grappling with manpower limitations. The article provides constructive criticism of the non-profit approach and offers suggestions as to how it might be strengthened.

The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, recognizes that with respect to peacekeeping, the UN ‘has sometimes been compared to a volunteer fire department’, but that this depiction is ‘too generous’.1 This observation comes despite the fact that, at present, the UN faces many blazes and smouldering fires requiring peacekeepers. Nevertheless, developed states are increasingly disengaged from participation in UN peacekeeping endeavours; in recent years 75 per cent of UN peacekeepers have come from developing states.2 However, many of these contingents lack the appropriate equipment and training. As for regional organizations authorized by the UN to run peacekeeping operations, they have, with the exception of NATO, often lacked appropriate levels of cohesion and capability. In light of these factors, the Brahimi Report on UN peace operations concluded that the UN ‘had repeatedly failed to meet the challenge’ of peacekeeping and was not improving on this score.3

Such challenges and difficulties prompt the suggestion that the UN should possess, or at least have access to, its own international peacekeeping capabilities. In fact, as a function of either international demand or dissatisfaction regarding member state contributions, the UN has considered, almost cyclically, the development of its own independent resourcing.4 Yet contemporary debates differ because of the presence of new non-state actors – private firms.5 These firms sell a variety of military and policing services to state and non-state clients, the UN included. Already, a trade organization, the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), exists to make the case for substantial private involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. The IPOA has asserted that a consortium of private firms might be appropriate for some peace support activities in regions such as central Africa.6 Although there has yet to be a fully privatized blue beret mission, the UN already relies on the services of these firms, many of
which are listed on the supply database for UN and UN-related organizations. Arguably then, peacekeeping is no longer a state-centric enterprise.

If states no longer possess a monopoly of UN peacekeeping duties, what are the possibilities for, and challenges facing, actors other than commercial companies that wish to participate in UN peacekeeping? Put differently, can there be a third way alongside state presence and private firm initiative? Analysis of the ‘fracturing’ of international affairs has found that non-state, non-profit actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), can play a substantial role in international governance. Moreover, the ethical and functional difficulties of profit-oriented actors contributing to the public international good have not gone unnoticed.

In order to answer the questions noted above, this article takes the example of the Global Peace and Security Partnership (GPSP), a proposed non-profit and non-state peacekeeping brigade at the disposal of the UN and other organizations. This British-based initiative, ten years in the making, is the brainchild of two Britons, Tobias Masterton and Edwyn Martin, and a Canadian, Michael Hepburn, and is largely in response to the perceived failings of UN peacekeeping operations during the 1990s. The non-profit approach is intriguing because it takes the perceived benefits of a private-sector response to conflict and attempts to package them in an organizational structure that is arguably more palatable in the contemporary international context. Certainly, the time is seemingly ripe for a different approach. Prominent global actors have expressed an interest in widening the array of assets and expertise that might be applied to peacekeeping endeavours. Note, for instance, the June 2004 G-8 Action Plan for Expanding Global Capabilities for Peace Support Operations. Additionally, both the US and the UK have indicated that many elements of UN peacekeeping need not rest in public hands. Although this particular initiative, the GPSP, has only been made public since April 2003, and it has no operational track record, it is appropriate to analyse and assess the conceptual foundations of the non-profit approach.

This article identifies the specific characteristics of the GPSP plan and then examines the non-profit approach in the context of ideas and debates about the management of force. It will be argued that while there is a real need for such an initiative, measured by demand for intervention and the problems of commercial responses, this third way will face considerable challenges. These will arise from entrenched interests in the UN and elsewhere, from contention with the varying and limited impact of the profit motive and from grappling with manpower limitations. Finally, the article presents constructive criticism of the non-profit approach and indicates potential avenues that might be followed.

**GPSP: A Non-profit Proposal**

The GPSP’s mission statement promises that the proposal would ‘provide a professional and experienced rapid response capability, with a strong service ethos, to complement the traditional peacekeeping forces deployed by the United Nations’. Its professionalism and experience would be derived from the rigorous selection process and regular GPSP-supplied training of the 5,000–10,000 multinational contingent on a GPSP-managed database. The pool of personnel
would be multidisciplinary in character and consist of mostly retired security sector personnel and humanitarian relief specialists. Once in the field, the GPSP would invite human rights organizations to monitor its activities. Quality control, consistent training, common experiences, and yet different capabilities, would serve to exploit the security and humanitarian skills of GPSP personnel. For any area of expertise in which the GPSP was found lacking, it would form partnering agreements with professional suppliers (for example, engineering support, demining and the removal of unexploded ordinance).13

A ‘strong service ethos’ would be manifest in the types of people serving the GPSP. Referring to the long history of the UK’s Royal National Lifeboat Institution and deployment of the (reservist) British Territorial Army in operations overseas, the GPSP suggests that a pool of personnel would be available: ‘Given this unbroken history of selfless commitment across such a variety of disciplines, GPSP is in no doubt that this public service ethos continues to thrive within the ranks of the uniformed services, their former employees and in civil society as a whole. It is this raw material that GPSP seeks to mobilise’.14

The ethos would be reinforced by the partnership’s remuneration and organizational structures. Operations and personnel would be paid out of the UN peacekeeping budget, the latter on lower scales than offered by private firms.15 The GPSP would not seek profit or have to satisfy the demands of shareholders. An international, non-partisan board of trustees would sanction the GPSP’s operations and ensure its corporate social responsibility.16 All operations and activities would be transparent to the international community and directed towards international peacekeeping missions.

Finally, the GPSP would complement UN efforts, both by default and by design. By default, the GPSP would not be a panacea, given the level of worldwide demand. Michael O’Hanlon and Peter Singer calculate that the global need for peacekeepers could be as high as 200,000 in the light of current conflict trends.17 Endeavours like the GPSP would not satiate the demand; the UN would still have to muster considerable resources elsewhere. However, although it might be a ‘drop in the bucket’, the GPSP could be an effective addition to UN capabilities that might also spur similar initiatives. By design, the proposal asserts that GPSP personnel would be mustered more quickly than the UN can achieve by mobilizing member states, and they could be deployed in advance to facilitate UN planning for a larger follow-on force.18 Similarly, to enhance the quality of potential peacekeepers from states, the GPSP would develop and deliver training programmes.19 In effect GPSP proposes to become a multi-faceted instrument in the UN’s ‘peacekeeping toolbox’.

Potential Advantages of the Non-profit Approach

The non-profit approach shares many of the perceived operational benefits of a commercial approach to international peacekeeping. Unlike state-based operations, profit-seeking actors can send assets more readily and quickly into an area through existing arrangements and the avoidance of political demands found at the national and multinational levels. This seemingly helps to avoid
suffering in war zones and the loss of credibility and of opportunities on the part of interventionists. Once in the field, firms are not saddled with conflicting burdens of separate national chains of command. Lastly, pre-deployment training and interoperability ensure coherence and efficiency in operations, attributes that are often lacking in multinational missions.

It is, however, the non-profit characteristics that make this approach intriguing in contrast to commercial actors. The GPSP argues that its force would be more accountable, not only for the oversight and management initiatives noted above, but specifically because of the removal of the profit factor. One can identify potential advantages that stem from this. For the GPSP, human rights might be better protected since corners would not be cut for financial profit: ‘Personnel [would] serve the public interest on a non-profit basis, thereby removing the dilemma of material gain versus human rights’. It could be argued that this would prevent the pejorative application of the ‘mercenary’ label and thus give legitimacy to a mission in the eyes of a local population. Additionally, the mission would be immune to changes in market conditions and costs that might instigate the departure of a private firm. Moreover, the non-profit approach might be more resilient than state and commercial operations in regard to casualty tolerance. The political implications of casualties for developed states and the high risk of fulfilling contractual obligations for firms can sometimes affect the reliability of these actors. To finish, the accountability and transparency of the non-profit approach might appeal to potential clients. Some humanitarian organizations have been hesitant to hire private security services when firms abide by non-disclosure for the sake of client confidentiality. Humanitarian organizations willing to hire security assistance often lack the resources to investigate a firm and risk becoming associated with dubious activities that could adversely affect their standing and income from donations.

In addition to these utilitarian factors, ideational matters contribute to the potential appeal of the non-profit approach as a halfway house between state and commercial initiatives. The doubtful moral probity of individual mercenaries attracts criticism and, increasingly, negative attention is focused on private forces employed by states. In the Weberian sense states are expected to have a monopoly of violence, and the appeals of nationalism and patriotism continue to inform the rationale for, and application of, organized violence under the direction of the state. Hence, the reliance of states on ‘mercenary’ forces is, for many, a contradiction and an anathema that brings into question the resolve of the state and the merits of the mission. Thus, the outsourcing of peacekeeping by the UN and other organizations has been described as ‘a cop-out’, and Jean-Marie Guéhenno, head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, comments that ‘With private troops, the first signal you send is: this is important, but not important enough to risk our own people’. In contrast, a non-profit stance places a force above the ‘base’ motives of profit and the negative connotations they seemingly entail.

Within the UN itself, considerable resistance and division exists regarding the continued use of firms to perform security-related activities. These reservations might not arise with a non-profit initiative. Not only does the idea of profit
combined with humanitarian objectives offend many within the UN, but the UN’s past history with soldiers of fortune in the Congo in the 1960s raises concerns, regardless of the differences between contemporary private firms and post-colonial soldiers of fortune. Furthermore, the use of mercenaries is against international law. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Use of Mercenaries is guided by the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention and the 1989 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, conventions that condemn the practice. By highlighting its sensitivity towards human rights, by removing the profit motive from this non-state endeavour, and by separating itself from the image of the soldier of fortune, a non-profit actor could be a unique ‘third way’ for UN peacekeeping.

Potential Challenges Facing the Non-profit Approach

Despite the functional and ideational advantages of a non-profit approach, many barriers exist to its activation, perceived utility and operational effectiveness. These concerns pertain to entrenched interests, the varying and limited impact of the profit motive and quantitative and qualitative manpower issues.

Entrenched Interests

Notwithstanding the merits of an ‘independent’ force such as the one proposed, it would not operate in a vacuum. Obstacles would arise in the UN Security Council, for the force would still be subject to the vagaries of great power decision-making. Difficulties would be posed by the requirement for Security Council action and restrictions imposed by the Security Council mandates. In the specific case of the GPSP, while its board of trustees would be expected to determine when forces are deployed, the ultimate decision on whether and how to act would still rest with the Security Council. The GPSP would not be a force fighting its way into environments under its own authority. If the Security Council chose not to act, then the GPSP would sit on the shelf. Should the Security Council choose to act, but under a mandate with which the board of trustees was not comfortable, the GPSP might nevertheless feel obliged to respond. As well, the Security Council might endorse a mission but then not be able or willing to send a multinational follow-on force. If it were implemented, the GPSP could not supply the political willingness to find lasting solutions to conflicts; this still rests with the Security Council. In short, the capabilities of the non-profit approach might not be employed and managed to their ultimate effectiveness.

With respect to the availability of resources, the ‘independence’ and freedom of action of the non-profit approach would also be compromised. On the one hand, such an initiative might have to rely on the capabilities of states (such as the heavy lift capability supplied by the US). This would give US policy-makers a de facto veto over a deployment if they disagreed with a particular operation or if American aerial capabilities were overstretched as in the Middle East and Central Asia today. Already, countries such as Canada that are highly reliant
on US assets have seen their military timetables pushed back because of US priorities. The same would apply to a non-profit approach.

On the other hand, civilian assets could be acquired, but here too the independence of the initiative might be compromised. A non-profit actor might not have the economic clout or the ability to develop economies of scale to make it financially viable for a commercial company to provide dedicated resources, or at least a standby service. As identified by Rhys Dogan and Michael Pugh, entering the subcontracting market is fraught with challenges, chief among them the limited ability of civilian providers to offer resources when and in the ways required. Additionally, the states in which firms are based might also influence the freedom of action exercised by a non-profit actor. In 2004 there were only 22 commercially operated Anatnov-124s available, arguably the most capable transport aircraft, and these were based only in the Ukraine and Russia. Access to this kind of aircraft might be limited, regardless of commercial considerations. Canada was fortunate to have access to them in the Kosovo war of 1999, given that the Ukraine and Russia were sympathetic to the Serbian cause. Moreover, problems even amongst NATO members can impact detrimentally upon contractual arrangements. In September 2003, the British government had contracted the French firm Corsair to fly British soldiers to Basra, Iraq in an Airbus 330, but it was grounded in Paris, officially for safety reasons. However, political motives may have played a role on account of French–UK disagreements over the Iraq war. Given that states have had to deal with these sorts of challenges, it is likely that a non-profit actor would face them as well, potentially hampering its operations.

The longstanding desire of humanitarian NGOs to cling to their independence would also impact specifically on the GPSP’s effectiveness. One of the unique aspects of the GPSP proposal would be the integration of in-house civilian humanitarian relief specialists. But historically, humanitarians have wished to distance themselves from UN peacekeeping operations so that (1) their delivery of assistance would not be affected by another organization, (2) affected populations would not view the delivery of assistance as linked to a political agenda and (3) affected populations would not associate the delivery of assistance with the possession of military might. As such, many humanitarian organizations have embraced ‘acceptance strategies’ to ensure the successful delivery of assistance. They abhor protection and deterrence strategies that often characterize forceful intervention, regardless of whether they are public or private in nature.

Given the problems that many humanitarians have faced over the past 15 years (including murders and kidnappings), some NGOs have entered warily into pragmatic relationships with both UN peacekeepers and private firms to secure protection. But the delivery of aid with the assistance of armed actors is still a cause of considerable consternation for humanitarian NGOs. Therefore, they might not embrace the ‘comprehensive’ nature of such a non-profit initiative. Not only would non-profit actors appear to step onto the operational ‘turf’ of NGOs, they would link aid delivery to armed force and the political direction of the UN Security Council, thereby compromising a particular aid operation and/or adversely affecting the general image of humanitarian activity.
The Varying and Limited Impact of the Profit Motive

In terms of promoting the appeal of a non-profit peacekeeping proposal, it is important to identify the limitations of arguments that stress the ‘evils’ of profit seeking. The degree to which the international community has embraced the commercial privatization of security (described above and below) suggests that concern about profits is only one variable in weighing up commercial actors. More specifically, how have the firms and their clients responded to the issue of profit and its impact on resilience in the field and the promotion of human rights?

The record of firms in terms of staying power in the field has been mixed. It is clear that no firm, drawn by the lure of higher reward, has changed sides in the midst of a conflict, probably because of the fear of eliminating future business prospects. This is but one way in which firms distinguish themselves from soldiers of fortune. Less clear, however, is the impact on firms that deviate from or terminate their contractual obligations. For example, Gurkha Security Guards (GSG), a British-based firm, accepted a contract in 1995 from the government of Sierra Leone to train and operate alongside the Sierra Leonean military, only to leave the country shortly after arrival when an ambush killed several of its employees. Consequently, its business opportunities decreased substantially. By contrast, ICI, an aerial support, response and surveillance firm that held a US State Department contract for operations in Liberia in the late 1990s, remained in the field despite heavy fighting. Its personnel even helped to defend the US embassy, though another firm assisting ICI, DynCorp, evacuated its personnel and left ICI in the lurch.

Yet DynCorp went on to hold lucrative contracts with various US government institutions in many of the world’s trouble spots such as Colombia, Iraq and the Balkans. Why was this the case? One reason is that DynCorp is one of the largest US-based service providers, holding contracts with states and non-state actors alike around the world, whereas GSG is a smaller organization with a limited client base. Additionally, much depends on whether potential clients are aware of a firm’s history, the nature of the task at hand and whether alternative firms can provide comparable services. Decisions are also dependent upon committed resources and ongoing relationships that might preclude clients from ending intricate commercial interactions. DynCorp’s Chief Executive Officer, Paul Lombardi, noted that ‘because we are so involved, it’s difficult to extricate us from the process’. In economic terms then, substantial transaction costs often exist that make it too difficult to reverse established interests, negate sunk costs and combat institutional inertia. A non-profit approach thus loses some of its appeal because clients may not overly care about being exposed to the vagaries of the marketplace.

A similarly mixed picture pertains to human rights. With respect to ‘indirect’ human rights – the unintended negative effects of a firm’s presence – analysis indicates that transaction costs are again relevant. Moreover, problems in human rights observance have been no more egregious among state and non-profit actors. As for ‘direct’ human rights abuse, firms are often keen to distinguish themselves from soldiers of fortune. Anticipation of profit has not generally led to a trade-off between material gain and human rights. As noted by one official of the
South African firm Executive Outcomes (EO), ‘The fastest thing that would get us out of business is human-rights violations’. In this vein, as argued by Yves Sandoz of the International Committee of the Red Cross, human rights assessments of profit-driven firms are less problematic compared to those of other forces, domestic and international, found in the world’s trouble spots. Tony Lynch and A.J. Walsh also contend that it is important not to overstate the assumed relationship between human rights abuse and profit: ‘Societies, if not sovereign nation-states, have existed and flourished under commodified organised violence, whilst decommodified and politicised violence has been responsible for a century [the twentieth] that will be remembered as the “Age of Genocides”’. Overall, the appeal of a non-profit approach is reduced in the absence of a clear link between human rights abuse and profit.

Finally, the GPSP itself seems unperturbed by firms profiting from conflict as it proposes to subcontract services when it lacks expertise. It has already formed a primary partnership with a British-based firm, Repaircraft PLC – Peacekeeping, Humanitarian, Development and Support Services. One can argue, therefore, that the partnership may not be overly disturbed by ‘for-profit’ worries related to market conditions and human rights. Moreover, the GPSP’s reliance on for-profit firms indicates the wide-range of capabilities, and the large numbers of individuals, that are found in the international private military/security sector. This observation leads to the last point of concern regarding the non-profit approach.

**Manpower Issues**

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of any non-profit proposal is two assumptions regarding manpower. First, in this case, the GPSP assumes that the ranks of the 5,000–10,000 strong contingent could be easily filled and constantly maintained. However, the expansion of the private security industry suggests that the necessary manpower levels may be difficult to attain. Whereas it was argued in the mid-1990s that private-sector growth was a mere blip resulting from the shrinking of militaries from cold war levels, an examination of current trends reveals otherwise. Firms have become credible and have expanded their services such that they constantly draw manpower out of state security sectors. Force reductions initiated at the end of the cold war left holes in state security sectors that the private sector can plug. The attacks of 11 September 2001 led state and non-state actors to reassess their security and turn to commercial firms. And, in the occupation of Iraq, the number of privately contracted personnel, perhaps as high as 20,000, is second only to the presence of US personnel, thus making Iraq ‘something of a latter-day Klondike’ for the private security industry.

Attractive remuneration rates, up to US$1,000 a day, also serve to draw personnel out of state security sectors. To combat the resulting ‘brawn drain’, the US, for instance, has instigated targeted ‘stop-loss’ programmes that prevent soldiers from leaving the services. Similarly, the UK has ‘begged’ firms not to poach its military personnel and has developed a sabbatical policy that allows uniformed personnel to leave the forces for a period of time to participate in the
private sector rather than lose them outright.\textsuperscript{47} Because the demand for personnel is so high and states are placing limitations on the transfer of personnel from the public to private sectors, firms have taken to recruiting employees from countries outside of the developed world. To work in places like Iraq, Blackwater USA, for example, has hired former Chilean commandos, and London-based Global Risk Strategies International has hired former Fijian peacekeepers. Other firms have tried to attract recruits from countries such as Pakistan and India. If firms are scrambling for high-quality people to service the demand, then this poses a severe problem for a non-profit approach.

The second troubling assumption is that qualified developed world personnel will fill the ranks of a non-profit initiative because of a strong ethos of service. Psychographic trends regarding ‘public ethos’ and ‘sense of service’ may throw doubt onto this assumption because the values of state security sectors and those who might serve in them have changed. Historically, military service was considered a special calling requiring self-denial and sacrifice for the sake of the state. For Sam Sarkensian, this calling ‘stresses honor and devotion to duty … subordinating self to the greater good’,\textsuperscript{48} values that have been described as ‘religious’.\textsuperscript{49} The Hegelian notion that conflict serves to unite the citizenry, and as a consequence buttress the state, worked to reinforce this sense of sacrifice and religious zeal.\textsuperscript{50} However, as noted by Jeff Tasseron, by the twenty-first century ‘war and violent nationalism are no longer acceptable as self-actualizing motivators’, with obvious effect upon the military as an institution that draws on the loyalties of citizens.\textsuperscript{51} In part, this shift occurred because of the increasing attempts in the twentieth century to outlaw aggressive war as a tool of statecraft. It also came about because of changes in values among the potential recruits and serving military personnel in the developed world. The World Values Surveys and other values studies have noted an increasing embrace of postmodern values, featuring a shift towards inward directedness, individualism and hedonism and away from communalism, outward directedness and deference to authority.\textsuperscript{52} This links well to findings in the military context. Charles Moskos and Frank Wood assert that occupational rather than institutional motivations are increasingly holding sway in the American military, for example.\textsuperscript{53} Individuals with an institutional attitude ‘see their service as a calling, recognize a “purpose” transcending individual self-interest … Those subscribing to an occupational orientation … put their own … interests ahead of the military and are willing to serve only to the limits established under the legal contractual agreement’.\textsuperscript{54} Consequently, developed world militaries have recognized that they must compete alongside the public sector to be an employer of choice, or as an American analyst puts it, ‘the military faces a war for talent … If it does not fundamentally rethink the way it attracts, develops, and retains people, it will lose this war’.\textsuperscript{55}

If state militaries are having difficulty attracting and keeping personnel because of the rise of postmodern values, how will a non-profit peacekeeping initiative be effectively resourced? If more security sector personnel are serving for occupational rather than institutional reasons, then it is more likely that they will just retire or accept lucrative positions with private firms, rather than engage in activities whose appeal rests in a ‘strong service ethos’.
Concluding Analysis and Suggestions

In the light of the challenges a non-profit approach faces, what might be done in order to ameliorate the situation? The level of demand worldwide for peacekeeping operations coupled with the paucity of dedicated UN resources suggests that this is a worthwhile question to answer.

First, emphasis should be placed on the qualitative, rather than quantitative, aspects. Since relatively unknown firms such as Enrys, Global Risk Strategies International and Meteoric have been able to obtain lucrative and important contracts in Iraq for the protection of the oil infrastructure, the guarding of UN offices and the training of a private Iraqi security force to guard government buildings, this points to expanding opportunities for private firms that will draw personnel. However, the fact that some firms hire nightclub ‘bouncers’ and karate experts in lieu of experienced military personnel reveals the qualitative costs of quantitative expansion. To distance itself from rogue elements, a non-profit initiative needs to make transparent the qualitative attributes of its limited number of personnel by, for example, making plain the rigour and oversight of its selection and training processes. Furthermore, the rigour and oversight should be directed at operations that a smaller number of individuals might successfully accomplish, such as training state security sector elements, protecting NGOs, or providing leadership capacity to UN operations.

Second, a non-profit approach could stress its ready and flexible array of capabilities. While the GPSP advertises that it is a multidisciplinary initiative with various areas of expertise, one can inquire if it is able to apply this wide-range of expertise simultaneously in an unstable environment. At present, military forces often seem hamstrung when faced with multi-task activities in intra-state conflicts where enforcement and aid delivery are conducted in close proximity by soldiers. If a non-profit actor could demonstrate that its personnel and training regimen allowed for flexibility and adaptability, its competence in handling contemporary conflict might be heightened.

Third, a non-profit actor could stress management and oversight specifically in relation to the UN. Although admittedly nothing to do with peacekeeping or the UN, the alleged use of torture in Iraq in 2004 by contracted personnel working for Titan Corporation and CACI International seems not to have occurred because personnel were balancing the tradeoffs of material gain on the one hand and human rights on the other. Rather, it probably occurred because either personnel were directed to torture prisoners, personnel loosely interpreted the directions given to them, or they acted independently and oversight was lacking. A non-profit actor could work to further integrate itself into UN mechanisms to safeguard the positive nature of the design and execution of its proposed operations. This would also, incidentally, perhaps allow it access to the UN’s larger contracting arrangements, thus permitting it to take advantage of the better-assured services and economies of scale available to the UN.

Although the current Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping is unsympathetic to the ‘privatization’ of peacekeeping, he notes that: ‘There is no definition for what [peacekeeping] entails, no criteria for when operations are to be
established, and no guidelines for how to plan and deploy them’. It is an open question, therefore, as to how peacekeeping might be conducted and by whom. Indeed, it is the flexibility inherent in the UN approach that allows for the revival over decades, in almost a pendulum-like fashion, of the idea of the UN developing independent peacekeeping capabilities. A non-profit approach would not be a panacea for the UN’s peacekeeping challenges, but the innovation evident in such an approach may be worth considering for the UN to advance its post-Brahimi agenda. As observed by Stephen Kinloch, ‘Utopianism, when not reflected upon from a perspective in the real world, breeds dangerous ideologies and systems. Reality, when not impregnated by utopianism, is condemned to inaction and sterility’. The non-profit approach could both serve as a catalyst for new thinking and, if properly executed, at least alleviate some of the peacekeeping demands the UN now faces.

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NOTES

9. The GPSP indicates that it would be willing to operate alongside other organizations such as NATO and the British Commonwealth. Nevertheless, the GPSP’s concept document stresses UN (in)activity and frequently compares the proposal alongside UN actors. This article is also UN-centric in its approach. Global Peace and Security Partnership, ‘Concept Paper’, April 2003, p.1, at www.gpsp.co.uk/index.html.
10. Tobias Masterton served for 11 years in the British Army and is currently a regular army reservist. Edwyn Martin is a former exploration geologist and a former reservist in the British Intelligence Corps. Michael Hepburn is a former global equities investment banker and software developer, and a former member of the British Territorial Army.


13. Ibid., p.16.

14. Ibid., p.3.


19. Ibid., p.11.

20. Ibid., p.5.


22. During the cold war, local populations referred to mercenaries operating in central Africa as ‘les affreux’ – the terrible ones.


42. Lynch and Walsh (see n.25 above), p.151.
47. Sean Rayment, ‘UK Soldiers to be allowed a year off to go to Iraq to earn £500 a day as guards’, Electronic Telegraph, 23 May 2004, at portal.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/05/23/nirq123.xml; Brady (see n.46 above).
49. For analysis of how these arguments have been applied in the Western context, see Christopher Coker, Waging War Without Warriors: The Changing Culture of Military Conflict, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002.
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